This paper takes an abstract look at the algorithms that constitute the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), and identifies for each protocol element the possible vulnerabilities and attacks -in a certain way, provides a "cookbook" for how to best attack an operational OLSRv2 network, or for how to proceed with developing protective countermeasures against these attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
OLSRv2 (the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol ver sion 2) [1], [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] is a successor to the widely deployed OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs (Mobile Ad hoc NETworks). OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as its predecessor, however offers various improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible architecture allowing extensions, such as for security, to be developed as add-ons to the basic protocol.
The developments reflected in OLSRv2 have been motivated by increased real-world deployment experiences, e.g. from networks such as FunkFeuer [7] , and the requirements pre sented for continued successful operation of these networks.
With participation in such networks increasing (the FunkFeuer community network has, e.g., roughly 400 individual partici pants), operating with the assumption, that participants can be "trusted" to behave in a non-destructive way, is utopia. Taking the Internet as an example, as participation in the network increases and becomes more diverse, more efforts are required to preserve the integrity and operation of the network. Most SMTP-servers were, e.g., initially available for use by all and sundry on the Internet -with an increased populace on the Internet, the recommended practice is to require authentication and accounting for users of such SMTP servers [8] .
A first step towards hardening against attacks disrupting the connectivity of a network, is to understand the vulnerabilities of routing protocol, managing the connectivity. This paper 2) MPR Flooding: The process whereby each router is able to, efficiently, conduct network-wide broadcasts. Each router designates, from among its bi-directional neighbors, a subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the router and relayed by the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop neighbors. MPR selection is encoded in outgoing HELLOs.
The set of routers having selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-selector-set of that router. A study of the MPR flooding algorithm can be found in [9] .
3) Link State Advertisement: The process whereby routers are determining which link state information to advertise through the network. Each router must advertise links between itself and its MPR-selector-set, in order to allow all routers to calculate shortest paths. Such ink state advertisements are carried in TC messages, are broadcast through the network using the MPR Flooding process. As a router selects MPRs only from among bi-directional neighbors, links advertised in TC are also bi-directional. TC messages are sent periodically, however certain events may trigger non-periodic TCs.
B. Link State Vulnerability Taxonomy
Proper functioning of OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each router can acquire and maintain a topology map, accurately reflecting the effective network topology; and (ii) that the network converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have suffi ciently identical topology maps. An OLSRv2 network can be disrupted by breaking either of these assumptions, specifically (a) routers may be prevented from acquiring a topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a topology map, which does not reflect the effective network topology; and (c) two or more routers may acquire inconsistent topology maps.
C. OLSRv2 Attack Vectors
Besides "radio jamming", attacks on OLSRv2 consist of a malicious router injecting "correctly looking, but invalid, 2) Flooding Disruption due to Link Spoofing: In the net work in figure 3 , the malicious router X spoofs links to the existing router c, as well as to a fictitious w. a receives HELLOs from X and b, reporting X:{X-c, X-w }, b:{b-c}. All else being equal, X appears a better choice as MPR than b, as X appears to cover all neighbors of b, plus w. As a will not select b as MPR, b will not relay flooded messages received from a. The routers left of b (starting with c) will, thus, not receive any flooded messages from or transiting a (e.g. a message originating from s).
B. Radio Jamming
Radio Jamming is an attack, in which access to the com munication channel between routers is hindered by, e.g., a powerful transmitter is generating "white noise" on the channel. Due to the ease of access to the channel, this is particularly possible in wireless networks. Jamming affects reception, thus interfaces on a "jammed" channel are unable to receive HELLO and TCs. Depending on lower layers, this may not affect transmissions: HELLOs and TCs from a router with "jammed" interfaces may be received by other routers. As the Neighborhood Discovery process of OLSRv2 identifies and uses only bi-directional links for the Link State Advertisement process, a link from a jammed router to a non-jammed router would not be considered, and the jammed router appear simply as "disconnected" for the un-jammed part of the networkwhich is able to maintain accurate topology maps.
III. EFFECTIVE TOPOLOGY
Link-state protocols assume that each router can acquire an accurate topology map, reflecting the effective network topology. This implies that the routing protocol, through its message exchange, identifies a path from a source to a destination, and this path is valid for forwarding data traffic.
A. Incorrect Forwarding
In OLSRv2, routers send TCs and HELLOs using link-local transmissions; the routing process in each router retransmits received messages, destined for network-wide diffusion. If the router is not configured to enable forwarding, this will not affect acquisition of a topology map by the routing protocol -but will cause a discrepancy between the effective topology and the topology map.
B. Wormholes
A wormhole, depicted in the example in figure 4, may be established between two collaborating devices, connected by an out-oj-band channel; these devices send traffic through the "tunnel" to their alter-ego, which "replays" the traffic. 2) Validity Time Attack: A malicious router, X, can spoof the identity of a router a and send a HELLO using a very low validity time (e.g. I ms). A receiving router b will discard the information upon expiration of that interval, i.e. a link between router a and b will be "tom down" by X.
E. Indirect Jamming
Indirect Jamming is when a malicious router X by its actions causes legitimate routers to generate inordinate amounts of control traffic. This increases channel occupation, and the overhead in each receiving router processing this control traffic. With this traffic originating from legitimate routers, the malicious device may remain undetected to the wider network.
1) Indirect Jamming: Neighborhood Discovery: Figure 5 illustrates indirect jamming of the Neighborhood Discovery process. A malicious router X advertises a symmetric spoofed link to the non-existing router b (at time to). a selects X as MPR upon reception of the HELLO, and will trigger a HELLO at tl. Overhearing this triggered HELLO, the attacker sends another HELLO at t2, advertising the link to b as lost, which leads to router a deselecting the attacker as MPR, and another triggered message at t3. The cycle may be repeated, alternating advertising the link X-b as LOST and SYM. In figure 8 , the malicious router X spoofs the address of a. If X selects f as MPR, all routers in the network will be informed about the link f-a by way the TCs originating from f Assuming that (the real) a selects b as MPR, the link b-a will also be advertised through the network.
b and c will calculate paths to a via b. e and f will calculate paths to a via f -i.e. through the malicious router X. e and f are thus disconnected from the real a. d will have the choice of selecting a path in to a in either direction.
In general, the following observations can be made: (i) the network will be split in two, with those routers closer to b than to X reaching a, and those routers closer to X than to b will be unable to reach a; (ii) routers beyond b, i.e. routers beyond one hop away from a will be unable to detect this identity spoofing.
The impact of combining identity spoofing with Link State
Advertisements is greater than the impact of section IV-Al, as it causes alterations to the topology maps of all routers in the network. The attack is also easier to detect: with the malicious router advertised through the network, routers whose identities spoofed can detect this. When a receives a TC message from f advertising the link f-a, it can deduce that "something is wrong" as a does not have f recorded as a direct neighbor.
B. Link Spoofing
Link spoofing can be employed by a malicious router via the Neighborhood Discovery process and via the Link State Advertisement process; either of which causing inconsistent topology maps in routers in the network.
i) inconsistent Topology Maps due to Neighborhood Dis covery: The malicious router X in figure 3 spoofs two links to c and w. Consequently, a selects X as its sole MPR -and therefore router X is the sole router expected to advertise links to a. s selects a as MPR, thus a is expected to advertise the link a-S through the network, i.e. using the MPR flooding process.
The topology maps acquired by the various routers in this example are:
• a and b: accurate topology map due to the Neighborhood Discovery process providing topological information up to 2 hops away.
• c: as in figure 9 (a). Link state advertisements from a are not forwarded by b. Existence of s and the link a-s is not known beyond b. Existence of a and the link b-a and is known to b through the Neighborhood Discovery process.
• d and beyond: as illustrated in figure 9 (b).
• s: accurate To pology Map corresponding to the network in figure 3 . This may contain the dotted routers c and w, only if X participates in the Link State Advertisement process (section IV-B2). 2) Inconsistent Topology Maps due to Link State Advertise ments: The malicious router X in figure 10 spoofs links to the existing a, by participating in the Link State Advertisement process and including the link X-a in its advertisements. Fig. 10 . Link Spoofing: The malicious router X advertises a spoofed link to router a in its TC messages, thus all routers will record the links X-a and b-a.
As TC messages are flooded through the network, all routers will receive and record information describing the link X-a. If a has selected b as MPR, a will likewise flood this link state information through the network, and all routers will receive and record information describing a link b-a.
Routers b, c and d will calculate a shortest path via a different router than routers f and g, thus leading to network split in two. This is similar to the impact of section IV-A2, and when a receives a TC message from X advertising the link X-a, it can likewise deduce that "something is wrong" as a does not have X recorded as a direct neighbor. VI. INHERENT OLSRv2 RESILIENCE While OLSRv2 does not specifically include security fea tures (such as encryption), it has some inherent resilience against part of the attacks described in this paper. In particular, it provides the following resilience:
V. VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
• Sequence numbers: OLSRv2 employs message sequence numbers, specific per router identity and message type. Routers keep an "information freshness" number (ANSN), incremented each time the content of a Link State Advertisement from a router changes. This allows rejecting "old" information and duplicate messages, and provides some protection against "message replay". This also presents an attack vector (section III-C).
• Ignoring un i-directional links: The Neighborhood Dis covery process detects and admits only bi-directional links for use in MPR selection and Link State Ad vertisement. Jamming attacks (section II-B) may affect only reception of control traffic, however OLSRv2 will correctly recognize, and ignore, such a link as not bi directional.
• Message interval bounds: The frequency of control mes sages, with minimum intervals imposed for HELLO and TCs. This may limit the impact from an indirect jamming attack (section III-E).
• Additional reasons for rejecting control messages: The Thomas has a particular affinity for "applicable research", and enjoys working with industrial part ners and standardisation bodies. He is, thus co-chair of the MANET AUTOCONF working group within the IETF, as well as the author and editor of several standard track and other documents within the IETF.
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